Another First-Hand Report on The Viet Cong Peace Terms, P. 3

An Error For Which a Peaceful Village Paid a Heavy Price

Saigon—U.S. Air Force B-52 jet bombers, flying their 21st mission of the war, yesterday blasted an area in the central highlands thought to be a fortified Viet Cong base. But UPI Correspondent Ray F. Herndon flew into the target area a few hours later and reported there were no signs of the Viet Cong having been there recently. The B-52s dropped hundreds of tons of high explosives on the hamlet of Phuong Xa Tay, which lies about 60 miles southwest of Da Nang and 325 miles northeast of Saigon. The raid had been ordered after intelligence experts concluded the hamlet to be a large Communist communications center. But Mr. Herndon reported that what aerial photoanalysts thought were sandbagged bunkers proved to be an ancient wall. What had appeared to be fortified trenches turned out to be seldom-used oxcart trails.

—New York Herald-Tribune, Sept. 11.

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Time to Get A New Secretary of State

The contrast between Johnson's record at home and his record abroad reflects the difference between the way domestic and foreign policy is made. The former is invigorated by pressure from below; the latter is deadened by a damper from above. The Johnson domestic program is the fruit of a generation's agitation, of democratic processes at their best, of the Negro demand for equality and the cry of the aged for security. But in the making of foreign policy, where new forces and old resentments raise in giant and perilous form the same challenge, the scene is dominated by stale ideas, presided over by a handful of men with a vested interest in past error, working in the State Department through our most inert bureaucracy, and with a huge "information service" i.e. a propaganda apparatus, at their disposal, to numb the public mind. At home we adjust to the future. Abroad we are stuck in the ruts of the past.

The Establishment Closes Ranks

A debate on this might have been sparked by the publication in *Life* Magazine recently of three installments from Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.'s, forthcoming memoirs of the Kennedy Administration. The third installment criticized the State Department and revealed that by the summer of 1963 Kennedy had reluctantly made up his mind "to allow Rusk to leave after the 1964 election." Kennedy's dissatisfaction with the Department was his Administration's best known secret. Yet instead of discussing Schlesinger's restrained but devastating analysis of the Department and of Rusk, the entire Establishment from Vice President Humphrey down closed ranks to praise Rusk and condemn Schlesinger. Attention was diverted from the weaknesses of the Department and Rusk to the question of whether Schlesinger should have disclosed Kennedy's intentions, and exposed Rusk to criticism. But after five years as Secretary of State, during which the policies he has applied have proven disastrously wrong from Cuba to Vietnam to Kashmir, isn't it time for a fresh look at the Secretary of State? Schlesinger would have stultified himself as a historian if he had suppressed the truth. But the effect has been to make it seem ungentlemanly to criticize Rusk; to render him more sacrosanct than ever. The Russians embalmed Lenin after he died. We seem to have embalmed our Secretary of State while he is still alive.

On The Eve of the Vote on the Challenge

Outside the dimly lit Negro church a white civil rights worker from Chicago just out of jail in Natchez said, "They believe in God and they believe in America. They believe God is good and America is just. For them defeat of the challenge would be like proof that God doesn't exist." He was talking of the four hundred Negroes with whom he had come up from Mississippi to support the Freedom Democratic Party challenge. The time was Wednesday night, Sept. 15. The House Administration Committee had just voted 19-to-5 for the Mississippi motion to dismiss without a hearing on the merits. The Negroes were preparing for a vigil at the Capitol, still hoping the House would reverse and uphold them. Two days of lobbying had begun to shake their faith. Many had never been North before. "It looks like we brought Mississippi with us," was one comment often repeated. In many offices their reception had been cold and superior. "It's the same Mr. Charlie." One Congressman asked, "Do you expect us to do any more for you people after Watts?" Inside the Church one elderly Negro preacher cried undaunted, "We're gonna make Mississippi the best State in the union." Winding up, Gospel style, he admonished, "You gotta love that white man." An elderly Negro woman grumbled from a front pew, "I love him but I sure don't trust him."

The Secretary in Schlesinger's portrait is a man who has cultivated facelessness. He wrote of Rusk (*Life*, July 30):

His mind, for all its strength and clarity, was irrevocably conventional. . . . He seemed actually to prefer stale to fresh ways of saying things. . . . He was totally unembarrassed by banality; the cliches of diplomacy were his native tongue. . . . The inscrutability which made him a good aide and a gifted negotiator made him also a baffling leader. When Assistant Secretaries brought him problems, he listened courteously, thanked them and let them go; they would often depart little wiser than they came. Since his subordinates did not know what he thought, they could not do what he wanted.

The portrait may be completed with a passage which *Life* omitted but which appeared in the version published by the London *Sunday Times* (Aug. 8):

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(Continued from Page One)

Rusk was equally secretive at the White House. . . . He rarely had strong views as to what should be done beyond continuing what we were already doing. . . . "He never gave me anything to chew on," the President would say, "he never puts it on the line. You never know what he is thinking."

Rusk Still Sees A Monolith

One of those rare occasions in which Rusk inadvertently allows one to see what he thinks occurred a few days ago during a talk he made before the American Political Science Association here. It was one of those long, serenely banal and almost entirely uncommunicative speeches characteristic of the Secretary. But midway he made a remark which gave the reporters and headline-writers something to fasten on. "Rusk Says All Reds Try to Encircle Free World," said the headline over the AP dispatch next day in the *Washington Star* (Sept. 8). The story reported (quite correctly) that the Secretary had said that the common strategy of all the world's Communist powers was to win control of Asia, Africa and Latin America "thus encircling and strangling the Atlantic world." Their differences, Rusk said "are about how to get on with their world revolution." This was hardly a wise remark at a time when U.S. policy is to play the more moderate Russians and Poles against the revolutionary Chinese. It was made particularly inept by the Kashmir crisis. It sounded like John Foster Dulles in its simple black-and-white Manichean view of the world and it brought to mind another passage in Schlesinger's memoirs—

I spent three years in the White House in a plaintive and unavailing effort to beg the State Department to stop using the phrase "Sino-Soviet bloc". This was a typical Foreign Service expression—barbarous in form and obsolescent in content. A memorandum to the State Department Secretariat in January 1963 said: Whatever substance the phrase might once have had as referring to a unified Russo-Chinese operation has surely been trickling away rather fast in recent months. Today the phrase . . . suggests that those who use it don't know what is going on in the world.

This unwillingness to acknowledge the centrifugal and pluralist tendencies transforming the Communist world is the path of safety in dealing with Congress. It also seems to represent Rusk's real views. When he shows his hand, it is that of a hard-liner, particularly on China policy. Indeed the strangest part of his story—a part Schlesinger does not tell and of which the Kennedy entourage to this day seems unaware—is that Rusk left the Truman Administration in 1951 as a hero of the China lobby, the MacArthurites and the hard-line Republicans. Yet he managed ten years later to get himself named Secretary of State in a new Democratic Administration pledged to a fresh start in foreign relations! The story I want to tell was all blacked out in Orwellian fashion when Rusk was appointed by Kennedy. It shows how hastily Kennedy picked his Secretary of State; he decided on Rusk, whom he had never met before, "after a single talk", according to Schlesinger. It also makes one wonder how wires are pulled in our society so that, as the French say, the more things change, the more they remain the same. The story is also important because it happened at a turning point in the Korean war. Then as now, in the Vietnamese war, we had to choose between negotiation and a limited conflict on the one hand and a collision course with China on the other. It was the collision course which Rusk favored.

That was one of the few occasions in his life when Rusk was incautious. It was on May 28, 1951. The UN forces in Korea had just fallen back from their last remaining positions above the 38th parallel. This meant that the North Koreans and the Chinese Communist "volunteers" had restored the status quo ante. The way was cleared for a settlement. Tru-

So Long As They Only Spoke of Frog's Legs

"Mrs. Johnson and Mme. Chiang discussed the beauty of this time of the year and the First Lady's most recent visit to Wyoming. They reminisced at length on the delightful visit of the Johnsons to Taiwan in May, 1961. Mrs. Johnson recalled the pedicab ride she had taken with the Vice President in Taiwan. Then they had a discussion about the frog leg industry in China. Mrs. Johnson recalled that canals used there for rice paddies are also used for raising frogs. Both recalled what delicacies they are."

—From the White House release on Mme. Chiang's visit to the White House for tea Sept. 14.

Then, Too, They Were All for Peace and Disarmament—They Only Wanted "Equality"

Germans Ask Finger on Nuclear Trigger in Words Which Recall Hitler's 30 Years Ago

"The Christian Democratic Union, in common with the Government of the Federal Republic, believes that it is unacceptable for there to be two classes of members in the NATO alliance. . . . In view of the German defense contribution and the situation of Germany, the Federal Republic must be granted a proper measure of co-decision in the question of nuclear weapons. . . . The Christian Democratic Union and the Federal government are always ready to support general and controlled disarmament."

—Christian Democratic Presidium, Aug. 23, 1965.

"Germany in any case is not ready to be regarded for all time as a second-class nation, or nation of inferior rights. Our love of peace is perhaps greater than that of other peoples, since we suffered most from the frightful war. None of us have the intention of threatening anyone; but every one of us is determined to ensure equality for the German people. . . . The German government is ready to agree to any limitation which leads to the abolition of the heaviest arms, especially suited for aggression."

—Adolf Hitler to the Nazi Reichstag, May 21, 1935.

Thirty years ago, when Hitler decreed universal military service and began massive rearmament in violation of the Versailles pact, he deluded Europe with a peace speech in which he claimed that he was merely seeking equality in armament. Now a campaign is building up in Germany, again on the plea of equality, to scrap its postwar promise to abstain from atomic, bacteriological and chemical weapons. The MLF proposal put forward by our State and Defense Departments has whetted German appetite for nuclear weapons. Germany's Social Democrats, probably the least socialistic and the most nationalistic of all the world's socialist parties, have begun to "me, too" this Christian Democratic drive. Willy Brandt has let it be known that if elected he will ask the U.S. to share the "know how" used in producing nuclear weapons (*New York Times*, Sept. 13), albeit only for peaceful purposes!

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man had just fired MacArthur for trying to widen the war, and had decided for negotiations to end it. Gen. Omar Bradley, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stood firmly with Truman against the MacArthurites; Bradley called the Korean conflict the wrong war at the wrong place and the wrong time. Rusk was then Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. He had been working closely with John Foster Dulles on the Japanese peace treaty. Rusk went to New York to address a dinner of the China Institute presided over by Henry Luce, without clearing his speech in advance with the State Department or the Pentagon (*Washington Post,* May 22, 1951). The two other speakers were Dulles and Senator Douglas of Illinois, who was supporting MacArthur and expansion of the war. Rusk took the China lobby line, too, and his speech made him the hero overnight of the Republican opposition. Taft called the speech a complete reversal of policy and an acceptance of MacArthur's views. On the other hand Walter Lippmann in a column, "Bradley v. Rusk" (May 22, 1951) protested that if the Rusk policy were to be adopted, "the war would go on indecisively and interminably." The reactions in the Pentagon, then for limited war, were described as "sulphurous" (*Wash. Post* May 22, 1951). It was made clear that Rusk was talking out of turn, and six months later he resigned to become president of the Rockefeller Foundation where his friend Dulles was chairman of the board. Rusk's salary was reported as somewhere between $50,000 and $75,000 a year, no mean consolation prize.

This tricky episode and its implications seem never to have been brought to Kennedy's attention. The fault seems to lie in part with Acheson, who himself grew more and more bitterly hard-line over the years, and joined in recommending Rusk to the President-elect. *Time* and *U.S. News & World Report,* which had made a hero of Rusk in 1951, protected him when the appointment was announced in December, 1960

How to Make Practically Anything Incomprehensible

State Dept's Top Planner in Full Take-Off

"If I may be permitted to use a somewhat private vocabulary, it can be said that during the past generation we have had in many parts of the world a take-off in which the leading sectors have been import-substitution industries in consumers goods fields; and for these nations to move on into the drive to industrial maturity requires that they convert their somewhat isolated urban industrial concentrations into active, dynamic centers which purposefully diffuse the process of modernization out across the nation, while they generate the capacity, on this wider market foundation, to pay their way as they move to full industrialization of their societies."

—W. W. Rostow, State Dept's Policy Planning chief, in a speech to the American Marketing Association, cited by the Washington Daily News *Sept. 11 as the year's finest specimen of gobbledygook.*

National Liberation Front for Private Ownership of Land

Famous British Peace Worker's Account of His Controversial Viet Peace Talks In Moscow

By Fenner Brockway*

My visit to Russia was private and had no official or even semi-official authority. But as Chairman of the British Council for Peace in Vietnam I took the opportunity to have discussions with the Ambassador of North Vietnam, and with representatives of the National Liberation Front, who are officially recognized in Moscow. My first surprise was that the Ambassador stated that his government would be prepared to take part in a reconvened Geneva conference. I had misunderstood that the Soviet Union, as co-chairman with Britain of the Geneva conference, declined to invite the nine powers to reassemble because of the opposition not only of China but of Vietnam. It is true that [the Ambassador] Mr. Nguyen van Kinh laid down that four basic principles must be accepted, but these do not seem to be inconsistent with the Geneva agreement, at least the essentials of which even President Johnson has endorsed as the basis for a peaceful settlement.

The four principles which North Vietnam asks are:

[(1) The independence and unity of Vietnam; (2) While separate administrations continue in North and South, neither to be in any military alliance and all foreign military troops and bases to be removed; (3) the people of South Vietnam to be free to decide their "political social and economic future without foreign interference" and (4) an eventual opportunity to reunite without foreign interference.]

I put a number of questions to clarify implementation of these principles. I was told it was visualized that South Vietnam would have a democratic representative government, and the Ambassador emphasized that it would have a democratic freedom to choose whether it would join the North in one state and, if so, when.

The Ambassador said one consideration in timing would be the different economic character of North and South Vietnam. As a Communist state North Vietnam has collectivized its agriculture. The National Liberation Front, despite the assertion that it is Communist, stands for peasant proprietorship.

My second surprise arose from the statement of the Ambassador that his government had never insisted that all the American troops should be withdrawn before talks for a cease-fire took place or before negotiations. My third surprise was to hear from the Ambassador that his Government would accept the International Commission set up by the Geneva conference, composed of Canada, India and Poland to ensure that the cease-fire was observed. He acknowledged that North Vietnam was disappointed by recent findings by Canada and India, but nevertheless his Government had accepted the Geneva agreement and would abide by it in letter and in spirit. The NLF representatives took a more stringent view. They did not believe that any international body could prevent America from consolidating its military strength during a cease-fire.

The North Vietnam and NLF representatives issued statements after I had reported my discussions. The North Vietnam Ambassador complained of misrepresentations not by me but by the Western press. I am not surprised in view of what the Voice of America distributed!

I must admit that one major obstruction to negotiations persists. The North Vietnam Ambassador insisted, and certainly the NLF would insist even more strongly, that in any negotiations the National Liberation Front must be accepted as the spokesman for South Vietnam. The North Vietnam Government will not concede that the series of governments which have been maintained in nominal office in Saigon have any representative authority whatever. It claims, on the other hand, that the NLF which controls two-thirds of the territory, represents the overwhelming majority.

* Veteran British Laborite, abridged from his account of these August talks in the Sept. 10, London Tribune.

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Rusk's View of China Proved To Be Complete Nonsense

Secretary Called Mao's Regime A Screen for Russian Takeover

(*Continued from Page Three*)

by omitting the story of how he had come to leave the Department nine years earlier.* When the nomination came before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, rightists like the Republican Hickenlooper and the Democrat Lausche indicated with quiet approval their knowledge of Rusk's China policy views. But the liberals were taken in; even Morse told Rusk the American people were "very fortunate" to have "a man with such an outstanding background" to advise the President-elect on foreign policy "in the troubled years ahead."

Shoulder to Shoulder With Luce and Meany

The kind of advice Rusk was likely to give was evident, but the liberal Senators weren't astute enough to see it. During Eisenhower's last year, those like Luce and George Meany who opposed any relaxation of tension had been opposing a summit meeting with Khrushchev. Rusk had made his contribution to their campaign with an article against summitry in *Foreign Affairs* (April, 1960). Fulbright did ask a question about this article but Rusk managed to evade any searching inquiry into his views on the subject. At one point, to show his continued interest in foreign affairs, Rusk volunteered that he had taken part "in such study groups as the Rockefeller Brothers panels." But no one questioned him about the step-up in the arms race and the hard-line foreign policies those panels had recommended. The relations between Rusk and the Rockefeller interests were never explored. When Fulbright asked the nominee if he had any private ties which might create a conflict of interest in his new post, Rusk said he did not think so. But he added that "at the time of the termination of my service with the Rockefeller Foundation the trustees expect to enter into a trust agreement with the Chase Manhattan Bank to provide severance pay for my services over a period of years." No one inquired into the details nor into the propriety of payments "over a period of years" to a Secretary of State from a bank like Chase Manhattan—the Standard Oil-Rockefeller family bank—with world-wide interests in foreign policy decisions.

Rusk's speech on China policy in 1951 is worth rereading now. It proved complete nonsense. He compared Mao's regime to the puppet Emperor's which Japan set up in Manchuria before the war under the name of Manchukuo. Rusk called Communist China "a Slavic Manchukuo." He declared the Russians had taken over Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, and North Korea and turned the Peking regime into "a colonial Russian government." This "puppet" regime has turned out to be Russia's most formidable rival and biggest foreign policy headache. History records few misjudgments as whopping, but Rusk remains the President's No. 1 adviser on China.

Truman got rid of Rusk in 1951. Kennedy, we now learn, wanted to get rid of him in 1963. How much longer will he go on being a faceless roadblock in the way of any fresh foreign policy?

*** The story was told in this Weekly (Dec. 6, 1960 and Jan. 23, 1961) in criticizing the nomination.**

Fulbright's Warning on Dominican Republic

"We misread prevailing tendencies in Latin America by overlooking or ignoring the fact that any reform movement is likely to attract Communist support. We failed to perceive that if we are automatically to oppose any reform movement that Communists adhere to, we are likely to end up opposing every reform movement. . . . One notes a general tendency on the part of our policy makers not to look beyond a Latin American politician's anti-Communism. . . . One also notes in certain government agencies, particularly the Department of Defense, a preoccupation with 'counterinsurgency' which is to say with the prospect of revolutions and the means of suppressing them. . . . The movement of the future in Latin America is social revolution. . . Whether it is to be Communist or democratic . . . depends in part on how the U.S. uses its great influence. . . . In the Dominican Republic . . . hope must be tempered by the fact that the military continues to wield great power . . . power which it would not now have if the U.S. had not intervened to save it from defeat.

—Fulbright to the Senate Sept. 15 in a great speech at press time condemning Johnson's intervention.

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